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The rise  of temporary employment contributes  to  the  fact  that people  can  no  longer 
count  on  life  time  employment  with  one  employer.  The  conclusion  that  life  time 
employment within the same organisation is no longer a prerogative for all, inspires the 
search for  new  career concepts.  'Life  time  employability'  is  often  put forward  as  an 
alternative to 'life time employment'. A successful career is, then, believed to be assured 
by having and  obtaining the  appropriate capacities for  being continuously employable 
on  the internal  and  external  labour market during one's  working  life.  At first  sight, 
temporary  employment relations  and  employability  go  hand  in  hand.  For temporary 
employment is  less  dramatic  when  it is  linked to  a higher employability.  The  career 
opportunities of temporary workers are safeguarded by their employability. Opponents, 
however,  add  some critical  observations  to  this  statement  and claim that contractual 
flexibility and employability enhancement are at odds. In this article, we  deal with this 
question. If temporary employment and employability enhancing activities are at odds, 
temporary employees  get  less  facilities  to  expand their employability.  This  can have 
important  implications  for  the  career  opportunities  of  temps.  We  compare  the 
employability enhancing activities  of temporary and  permanent employees.  We study 
one central employability enhancing activity, namely training. Firstly, we have a look at 
the capacity and the willingness of temporary and permanent employees to participate in 
training in  order to enhance  their employability. Secondly,  we also  study the  training 
opportunities that are offered by employers to temporary and permanent employees. The 
results indicate that, although temps do largely take responsibility for their own training, 
they get less opportunities to enhance their employability than permanent employees. TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AND 'EMPLOYABILITY'. 
Training Opportunities and Efforts of Temporary and Permanent Employees. 
The increasing prevalence of temporary employment is  an  unmistakable development. 
In  Flanders  the proportion  of temporary  employees  has  increased  steadily  since  the 
second half of the  1990s  (Steunpunt WAV,  2000). While in  1990,5% of all  salaried 
employees in the Flemish Region of Belgium had temporary contracts, the proportion 
had  already  reached  approximately  10%  in  1999.  Concerns  are  increasingly  being 
voiced that lifelong job security with the  same employer is  being jeopardised by this 
increasing prevalence of temporary work (de Grip, Van Loo & Sanders, 1999; Gaspersz 
&  Ott,  1996).  The  2000-2004  Policy  Memorandum  from  Flemish  Minister  for 
Employment Landuyt speaks of a changing career model  in  which people increasingly 
frequently face job insecurity and can no longer count on lifelong employment with a 
single employer. Many people, however,  do  not see this development as  a reason for 
despair.  Since lifelong employment with  a single employer is  guaranteed less and less 
often, job security must be found in some other way. From that point of view 'life-time 
employability' is being put forward as  an  alternative to the old 'life-time employment' 
(Gaspersz &  Ott, 1996). 
Employability points to  the permanent ability of employees to  gain  employment in 
the internal and external labour market. It is the ability to find and keep a job with one's 
current employer or with another (Delsen,  1998). Individual employees are expected to 
take more responsibility for their own professional  training and career planning. This 
does  imply  that  employers  must  give  their  employees  opportunities  to  take  this 
responsibility for their own  careers. Employers are expected, for example, to invest in 
training and to offer greater variation in tasks and suitable jobs. According to Gaspersz 
&  Ott (1996)  the exchange relationship between employer and employee therefore no 
longer consists  of a  salary  and  security from  the  employer  in  return  for  permanent 
loyalty and good work from the employee. In the 'new' relationship, the employer offers 
a  salary  and  opportunities  to  increase  employability  in  exchange  for  the  effort and 
commitment of the employee to the work that is being done. Employees have a primary 
loyalty to their own careers. 
At first sight the increasingly temporary character of the employment relationship and 
'lifelong employability' fit neatly into the same picture. For the increasingly temporary 
character  of employment  has  less  dramatic  effects  when  it  is  balanced  by  greater 
employability.  Critics,  however,  add  a number of important comments  to  this  view. 
Delsen  (1998)  goes  as  far  as  to  assert  that  contractual  flexibility  and  'life-long 
employability' are diametrically opposed. Delsen's argument is that greater contractual 
flexibility  increases  uncertainty  at  the  expense  of the  stability  that  is  necessary  to 
achieve  internal employee flexibility  and employability.  Promoting employability, for 
example, is associated with high training costs. This investment can only be recouped if 
employees continue to work for the company for a long enough period of time. Training 
aimed at  increasing the employability of employees also  reinforces  those employees' 
opportunities on the external labour market. As a result there is also a greater likelihood 
that the employee will leave the business before the investments in  'human capital' has 
yielded an adequate return. Companies can solve this problem by binding employees to 
the company in many different  ways  (Gaspersz &  Ott,  1996).  This,  of course,  takes 
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the promotion of employability therefore hinder one another (Delsen, 1998). 
Employees  may  also  be  faced  with  dilemmas  in  relation  to  the  promotion  of 
employability. Working on one's own employability requires a long-term perspective on 
one's career. Efforts to achieve short-term results within one's current job may, however, 
be made at the expense of these longer-term objectives. Research in  the United States 
has  shown that employees with short-term contracts are more focused on  maximising 
income in the short term rather than training for future jobs which are as  yet unknown 
(Del sen,  1998;  de  Vries,  1995).  All  these  arguments  give  rise  to  the  suspicion  that 
temporary employment relationships discourage the promotion of employability rather 
than encouraging it. 
What is more, employability is  not a static factor, but it can grow exponentially. Job 
expansion, job changes and external mobility are  all  ways  of gaining new  knowledge 
and  skills,  and  in  this  sense  they  increase  opportunities  on  the  internal  and  external 
labour  market  (de  Grip  et  a!.,  1998).  They  do  not,  however,  only  lead  to  better 
opportunities  in  the  labour  market.  They  can  also  be  a  consequence  of  greater 
employability (de Feyter, Smulders &  de Vroome, 2001). A person who has held more 
different jobs can  find  work  more  easily  in  the labour market.  Those  who  are  more 
employable then also have greater opportunities of further mobility. A new job means 
new knowledge and skills, as a result of which employability increases once again. This 
results  in  a  snowball  effect.  Companies  that  give  their  employees  opportunities  to 
promote  their employability  may  start  off that  snowball  and  reinforce  the  extent to 
which  employees are  able to  enhance their own employability in  future. If temporary 
employment and employability enhancing activities  are  at  odds, temporary employees 
may  have  fewer  career  opportunities  than  permanent  employees.  An  employability 
policy focused only on permanent employees could, therefore,  give  rise to  increasing 
duality in the labour market. In that case employability certainly cannot be put forward 
as an alternative to job security. 
We look at this theme in  this essay. We tackle the question whether employees who 
enjoy less job security also participate less in employability enhancing activities. This 
would point to an accumulation of risks. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Employability is  quite a diffuse term, and it is  hitched to  different meanings precisely 
because it is  so  vague. Although employability became a buzz word in  organisational 
literature, no clear consensus about its  specific meaning can  be found.  In some of the 
more managerial literature, employability is  approached as  an  organisational goal. The 
focus  of attention  goes  to  building functional  flexibility  within  the  organisation  (de 
Vries,  Griindemann  &  van  Vuuren,  1999;  Gaspersz  &  Ott,  1996;  Gaspersz,  1999; 
Paauwe  &  Hoeksema,  1996).  Other  authors  direct  employability  mainly  as  a 
characteristic  of individual  employees.  Some  of these  authors  are  focusing  on  the 
capacities of employees (de Vries et a!.,  1999; Wilk &  Sackett, 1996) while others are 
directing their willingness, beliefs and attitudes (Noe & Barber, 1993). Some definitions 
integrate both aspects  (de Grip et al.  1999;  Gaspersz  &  Ott,  1996;  Peck & Theodore, 
3 2000; van Dam, 1999; van der Velde & van den Berg, 1999). Furthermore, the focus can 
be on employability on the internal labour market or on the external labour market. 
Since  no  clear  conceptual  model  of  employability  exists,  there  are  as  many 
measurements as researchers of the topic. Some research is measuring employability by 
what  are  believed  to  be  determining  factors,  such  as  capacities  of individuals,  their 
intentions or their participation in activities enhancing their employability, e.g. training. 
Other research  is  measuring  employability  by  its  effects,  such  as  transitions  on  the 
labour market. 
Besides the  lack of a clear definition  and a well-defined conceptual  model, there is 
also  some  indistinctness  in  literature  about  who  is  responsible  for  somebody's 
employability.  While  some  authors  consider  the  employee  to  have  the  final 
responsibility for his  or her employability,  other authors  are  stressing the duty of the 
employer and the government to create opportunities for enhancing one's employability 
(Outin, 1990; ILO, 2000). 
ill this essay we focus  as  well  on the employees'  willingness and ability to  enhance 
their employability as  on  the  conditions shaped by the employers to  do  so.  This is  in 
accordance  with  the  definition  of  Thijssen  (1998,  2000)  in  which  he  describes 
employability as the whole range of personal and contextual factors that will influence 
one's future position in a given labour market. Thijssen's definition comprises not only 
employees' ability and willingness to  exploit and  enhance their current employability, 
but also context-based factors  which  help or hinder the effectuation of employability. 
The opportunities to  promote  employability which  are  provided by the  employer are 
therefore included in the definition. 
The question  about  the  measurement of employability  still  remains  however.  The 
objective  of  this  essay  is  not  to  develop  an  all-encompassing  measurement  of 
employability  including  all  possible personal  and  contextual  factors.  We  are  mainly 
interested  in  the  employability  enhancing  activities  of  temporary  and  permanent 
employees and their respective employers. We therefore decided to focus  in  this essay 
on  one crucial employability enhancing activity,  namely training. Training is  a central 
issue  in  the  employability debate.  In  our knowledge  society,  continuous  training and 
education are widely acknowledged as  being of crucial importance to stay competitive 
on both the internal and the external labour market. In the 2000-2004 Policy Note from 
Flemish Minister for Employment Landuyt, the right to lifelong learning and to social, 
professional and personal development is put forward  as  a basic right of citizens. This 
right, however, also entails the obligation 'to  enter into a moral contract to  shape this 
personal development in everyday life and to open it up for the  enrichment of society' 
(Policy Memorandum 2000 - 2004, p.  105). Investing in one's own human capital forms 
an essential part of one's own  employability. Employers are expected to  offer facilities 
to improve and enhance employability by means of training that transcends both the job 
and the organisation. 
Although the importance of 'lifelong learning' for opportunities on the labour market 
is  widely  recognised,  few  research  has,  however,  directly  studied  the  relationship 
between  the  duration  of  the  employment  relationship  and  training  activities. 
Furthermore, hardly any research looks at  the same time at  training initiatives of both 
the  employer  and  the  employee.  In  this  essay,  we  would  like  to  fill  this  gap.  We 
therefore want to formulate answers to the following research questions: 
4 1.  Do temporary and permanent employees receive equal  opportunities from  their 
employers to promote their employability through training? 
2.  Are there differences in the extent to which temporary and permanent employees 
devote time and energy to  their training and development to promote their own 
employability? 
METHODOLOGY 
In  the  context  of a  wider  survey  on  the  impact  of the  institutional  context  on  the 
flexibility policies of industrial and service companies and on its consequences in terms 
of the quality of the organisations and the quality of labour, a written questionnaire was 
distributed  in  2000  to  three  groups  of employees  (postal  survey):  employees  with 
permanent  contracts,  employees  with  fixed-term  contracts  and  temporary  agency 
workers. A random sample was drawn from the respective populations for each of these 
groups. This sample was stratified by the age and sex of the population (1000 temporary 
agency  workers,  1000  employees  with  fixed-term  contracts  and  800  permanent 
employees). In total data was collected from 521  temporary employees (227 temporary 
agency workers and 294 employees with fixed-term contracts) and from 197 permanent 
employees. 
In table 1 we compare the main biographical characteristics of the respondents with 
the  population  data.  We  find  similar  differences  between  temporary  and  permanent 
employees  among  the  respondents  and  the  population  in  Flanders.  Temporary 
employees  are  significantly  younger  on  average  than  permanent  employees.  Another 
noticeable difference is  the fact that the majority of temporary employees are women. 
Among  the  respondents  the  proportion  of  women  among  temporary  employees  is 
smaller than in  the population as  a whole.  In  terms  of educational level  there are  not 
many differences between permanent and temporary employees in  Flanders. All  levels 
are represented approximately equally in  both  groups.  Among the  respondents, poorly 
educated people are under-represented among temporary employees. 
5 Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics. Characteristics of the Respondents and the Population 
in Flanders. (percentages) 
Response  Flanders (1999) 
Permanent  Temporary  Permanent  Temporary 
work  work  work  work 
Age: 
Younger than 25  6.1  33.8  7.9  37.7 
25-49  76.0  63.3  76.9  57.5 
50+  17.9  2.9  15.2  4.8 
Sex: 
Male  60.7  45.l  59.9  39.8 
Female  39.3  54.5  41.1  60.2 
Educational level: 
Primary school.  30.8  21.6  31.0  31.4 
Secondary School  33.7  43.2  37.8  37.4 
Higher education  35.5  35.2  31.2  31.2 
n  179  521  1877 956  194500 
source: NIS EAK 
HYPOTHESES 
Before discussing the results of the survey, we will look in  more detail at the research 
questions. We consider a few theoretical frameworks and results of empirical research 
which give rise to the suspicion that there is a trade-off between temporary employment 
relationships and training. 
Training Opportunities for Temporary and Permanent Employees 
One  of  the  main  arguments  against  the  increasingly  temporary  character  of  the 
employment relationship is  that it can  lead to under-investment in human capital. An 
increase  in  the  number  of temporary  contracts  is  thought  to  inhibit  investment  in 
training. The reasoning behind this  is  that the temporary character of the employment 
relationship adversely affects the willingness to invest, because the payback period for 
the investment is reduced. 
This reasoning is based on the Human Capital Theory (Becker,  1964; Mincer,  1974). 
This  economic  theory  dominates  the  debate  on  investment  in  training.  The  Human 
Capital Theory supposes that companies  invest in  human  capital  in  a rational  way.  A 
company  acting  rationally  can  be  expected  only  to  invest  in  training  if employee 
productivity increases sufficiently to recover the cost of the training. The Human Capital 
Theory starts from the  assumption that employee productivity is  solely dependent  on 
employee characteristics such as age, job tenure and qualifications. 
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specific  training.  General  training  teaches  skills  that  can  also  be  used  outside  the 
company. It increases  an  employee's  value  (and opportunities)  on  the  external  labour 
market.  In  fear  that  this  kind  of  investment  will  be  poached  by  other  companies, 
companies do not tend to  invest in general skills. Specific training, on  the other hand, 
only increases the employee's productivity when working for the employer who provides 
the training. The amount of company-specific training is said to be related to the period 
of time spent in  the company.  The  greater the likelihood that someone  will  leave the 
business soon, the shorter the time in which the investment in training can be recovered 
through increased productivity. 
On the basis  of this  reasoning,  temporary employees  have fewer  opportunities for 
specific  training than  permanent employees.  Temporary  employees,  however,  benefit 
mainly from transferable knowledge because this allows them to  improve their chances 
in the external labour market (Ramioul, 1999). According to the Human Capital Theory, 
however, companies do not tend to invest much in general training. This applies both to 
fixed and to temporary employees. 
One  criticism  of the  Human  Capital  Theory  which  is  often  expressed  is  that,  in 
reality,  companies  do  invest  in  general  training.  The  perspectives  of  information 
economics build on the insights of the Human Capital Theory but offer an explanation 
for this general training within companies. The information economy departs from the 
idea of a perfect labour market and takes information asymmetries into  account.  This 
means that not all  the players in  the labour market have the  same information at their 
disposal.  Katz & Ziderman (1990) assume that employers, prior to recruitment, do  not 
have  all  the  information  about  the  training  that  candidate  employees  have  received. 
Hence they may, for example, not have a good view of the nature and amount of on-the-
job  training  that  they  have  received.  Companies  recruiting  new  employees  are 
consequently faced with an  additional risk, an extra information cost. The level of this 
information cost depends on a number of different factors.  Formal training certificates, 
for  instance,  can  keep  the  information  cost  down.  According  to  the  ideas  held  by 
information  economists,  companies  will  underestimate  the  training  of potential  new 
employees if they do not have sufficiently reliable information on the training they have 
received. In this way they reduce their own risks. The value of the training is therefore 
higher for the  companies  which  have  made  the  investment  than  for  the  companies 
poaching the trained employees. It is precisely for this reason that employers may decide 
to provide general training themselves. This is because information asymmetry reduces 
the  likelihood that employees who  have  received general  training will  be poached by 
another company. The main difference between the Human Capital Theory and the view 
taken  by information  economists is  the  latter's  assertion  that  companies  do  invest in 
general training. On another point, however, they do not differ from the Human Capital 
Theory.  The  perspectives  of information  economics  still  treat  training  purely  as  an 
investment. From this perspective it is also assumed that this investment only becomes 
profitable if the duration of the employment relationship is  long enough. According to 
this  approach  temporary employees  therefore  have  less  likelihood of receiving  (both 
specific and general) training than permanent employees. 
The Human Capital Theory and  information economics  are often criticised because 
they only consider the financial benefits and costs of training. Despite this criticism we 
are basing our hypotheses on these economic approaches because they do dominate the 
7 debate on  companies' investments  in  training. What  is  more,  these  theories  form  the 
basis  for  one of the main  arguments  against  the  increasingly temporary  character of 
employment  relationships,  namely  the  danger  of under-investment  in  training.  Our 
analyses do  allow us  to  test the explanatory value of these perspectives. According to 
the  Human Capital Theory,  temporary employees  are  less  likely to  receive company-
specific training than permanent employees. The perspectives of information economics 
add  to  this  the  fact  that temporary employees  are  also  less  likely  to  receive  general 
training than permanent employees. So we arrive at the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1:  Temporary employees are less likely to receive training financed by 
their employer than permanent employees. 
Hypothesis 2a:  Temporary  employees  are  less  likely  to  receive  specific  training 
financed by their employer than permanent employees. 
Hypothesis 2b:  Temporary  employees  are  less  likely  to  receive  general  training, 
financed by their employer, than permanent employees. 
Training Efforts Made by Temporary and Permanent Employees 
Thunnissen  &  de  Lange  (2000)  assert  that  in  the  'new'  psychological  contract, 
relationships have got out of balance. The employer is willing to offer a good salary, but 
cannot  guarantee  a  future  within  the  organisation.  The  employers  demand  that  the 
employee  should  continue  to  develop  and  train,  but  they  cannot  guarantee  that the 
benefits  of this  will be  reaped  within their own  organisation.  The  question therefore 
arises  of whether  temporary  employees,  who  are  not  entitled to  a  future  with  their 
existing  employer  to  the  same  extent,  are  willing  to  make  that  investment.  If we 
extrapolate the Human Capital idea we can assume that temporary employees will not 
be much inclined to  invest in specific knowledge themselves. Employees only have an 
interest in  specific training  if they continue to work for  that employer.  Investment in 
general  training,  on  the  other  hand,  enhances  opportunities  in  the  external  labour 
market. Temporary employees therefore benefit considerably from  investing in general 
training. 
Empirical research into participation in training by temporary employees often throws 
light on a number of different facets which make it difficult to gain a clear perspective. 
What  is  more,  the  results  contradict  each  other.  Research  in  the  US  shows  that 
employees with short-term contracts are focused more on maximising their income in 
the short term than on training for as yet unknown future jobs (Del sen,  1998; de Vries, 
1995). De Feyter et al.  (200 I) observe that permanent employees  participate more in 
job-oriented  training  than  temporary  employees.  They  find  no  difference  between 
temporary and permanent employees in the extent to which general training takes place. 
One possible explanation might be that general training  is  less  often  financed  by the 
employer. Permanent employees therefore may give up more quickly while temporary 
employees have more of a tendency to  finance  their  general  training  themselves.  De 
Feyter et aI., however, do not draw any distinction in terms of the financing of training. 
Delsen (1998) observes that participation in training overall is lower for employees with 
a flexible contract of employment. He also refers to a survey carried out by Jonker et al. 
(1997) which shows that participation in training by permanent employees is more often 
8 paid for by the employer (78%) than participation in  training by  temporary employees 
(47%).41 % of temporary employees pay for their training completely themselves. In the 
case  of permanent employees  this  proportion  is  only  18%.  Results  from  Steunpunt 
WA  V  (2000)  show,  surprisingly,  that  the  likelihood  of participation  in  training  in 
Flanders  is  greater for temporary employees than it  is  for  permanent employees. The 
authors  suppose  that  this  often  involves  new  employees  who  are  taken  on  with  a 
temporary (trial) contract and immediately take part in initial company training. 
We  start  from  the  hypothesis  that  temporary  employees  generally  participate  in 
training less because they receive less training opportunities from their employer. We 
also suspect that temporary employees who receive training invest more time and money 
in their training than permanent employees who participate in  training. We would also 
like to find out whether temporary employees invest mainly in general training that will 
reinforce their position in the labour market. 
Hypothesis 3:  Temporary  employees  participate  in  training  less  than  permanent 
employees. 
Hypothesis 4:  Those temporary employees who participate in  training invest more 
in their training themselves than permanent employees. 
Hypothesis 5:  The  investment  in  training  by  temporary  employees  is  mainly 
focused on general training that will reinforce their position in the labour market. 
We will test these hypotheses below by means of a few statistical analyses. First we will 
look at the extent to which temporary and permanent employees participate in  training. 
We will  then  investigate who  finances  the training.  Finally  we  will  then  look at  the 
content and the purpose of the training. In  this way we can  investigate the motives of 
employers and temporary and permanent employees in investing in training. 
RESULTS 
Participation in Training 
De Grip et al.  (1998;  1999) see the willingness and ability to participate in  training as 
two  important indicators of employability.  They define the  Willingness  and ability to 
train  as  the  willingness and  ability  of employees  to  devote  time  and energy to  their 
training and development to promote their own employability. In  table 2 we look at the 
willingness and ability to  train of the respondents. We only  have a limited number of 
indicators that will point to  their ability to train. These indicators show the amount of 
training that a person has already received in the past. The amount of training received 
may be an indication of the  ability to train, but it is certainly not comprehensive. The 
data does not, however, include any supplementary indicators of the ability to train. In 
this discussion we will therefore look solely at past training. 
We make a comparison between various groups of employees. First of all  we look at 
differences between those employees with permanent contracts (permanent employees) 
and those with temporary contracts (employees with fixed-term contracts and temporary 
agency  workers). We also  find  out whether there are  differences  within the  group  of 
9 temporary employees and we compare the employees with fixed-term contracts with the 
temporary  agency  workers.  In  addition  we  investigate  whether  the  prospect  of  a 
permanent job with the current employer has an influence. In  the survey the temporary 
employees were  asked  what they  thought  their chances  were  of getting  a permanent 
contract with their present employer. The possible answers were on  a scale from 1 (very 
good) to  5 (very poor or non-existent).  On the basis  of these variables we divided the 
temporary employees into two groups. We differentiate between those who consider that 
the likelihood of a permanent job with their current employer is high (answer categories 
'very good' (I) to 'good' (2)) and the others (answer categories 'neither good nor bad' (3) 
to 'very poor or non-existent' (5)) 
The  results  in  table  2  show  that  both  temporary  and  permanent  employees  are 
certainly  not  negative  towards  training  courses.  About  90%  are  willing to  engage  in 
extra training.  Of course this  is  only an  intention. Whether they will  actually do  what 
they say when  the opportunity arises  is  a question  we  must leave  aside for  now.  The 
proportion of employees  who  do  not expect  a permanent contract with  their  present 
employers and  who  are  willing to take extra training is  slightly smaller.  Nevertheless 
they still make up 87.5% of the group. 
It  was  also  found  that  approximately  one-third  of the  temporary  employees  have 
actually taken training courses during the past year  which are  relevant to  their career. 
Among permanent employees the percentage is  higher  at  43.5%.  We  do  not find  any 
significant differences within the group of temporary employees. 
10 Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics (percentages). Participation in Training. 
Pennanent  Temporary  p  Fixed-term  Agency  p  High likelihood  Lower likelihood  p 
work  work  contract  work  of a  of a 
permanent job  permanent job-
Are willing to receive extra  89.9  89.8  ns  89.3  90.5  ns  94.4  87.5  * 
training if they get the opportunity 
Received training (during the last  43.5  33.8  *  36.6  30.2  ns  36.7  32.0  ns 
year) that was relevant for their 
career (on the internal and external 
labour market) 
n  177  517  292  225  179  132 
*  p< .05 
**  p< .01 
***  P < .001 
11 In  order to gain a better view of the factors that determine who takes part in training we 
use  a  number of variables  and incorporate them  in  a  logistic  regression  model.  The 
variable to be explained is a binary variable with a value of 0 (has not been on a training 
course during the past year) and 1 (has been on a training course during the past year). In 
order to ascertain whether the nature of the employment relationship (permanent versus 
temporary)  influences  the  participation  in  training,  it  is  necessary  to  control  for  the 
differences in  biographical characteristics between the two groups. We have therefore 
included  sex  and  age  as  control  variables.  It  is  often  assumed  that  a  number  of 
'disadvantaged' groups in the labour market are still able to find work through temporary 
employment. As well as  women and young people, these  are  often thought to  include 
'new  household  types'  such  as  single  people  and  single  parent  families  (Steunpunt 
WAY, 2000). We have therefore distinguished single people from married or cohabiting 
people in  this model.  Table  1 shows that  the  educational level  does  not differ much 
between  the permanent and  temporary employees. We have therefore chosen to use  a 
check based on the job level rather than the educational level  1(1). The classification by 
job level does differ (table 3). The group of permanent employees contains less white-
collar  workers  (or  mental  workers)  but  more  professionals  and  executives.  This 
distribution corresponds to population figures (Peeters, 1999). 
Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics (percentages). The Job Level of Permanent and 
Temporary Employees. 
Unskilled blue-collar worker 




















Fixed-term  Agency work 
Contract 
13.8  16.5 
20.4  40.2 
52.4  39.3 
13.5  4.0 
0.0  0.0 
275  224 
The results of the logistic regression (table 4) show that the likelihood of an employee 
participating in training grows the higher his job level. The odds ratio indicates that the 
I  We  also  ran  the  analyses  based  on  educational  level  as  an  independent  variable,  but  we  found  that 
educational level had no significant impact on the various dependent variables. 
12 odds for executives are  10  times higher than the odds for poorly educated blue-collar 
workers. The odds point to the likelihood of a person participating in training versus the 
likelihood  of  their  not  participating  in  training.  We  cannot  find  any  significant 
difference between the likelihood of training for permanent and temporary workers. H 
we check by job level, age, sex and family situation, temporary workers have the same 
likelihood of participating  in  training  as  permanent employees.  This  is  a remarkable 
observation,  which  contradicts  the  expectations  of  the  Human  Capital  Theory. 
Hypothesis 3 is not confirmed. Temporary employees, all  other things being equal, do 
not  participate  in  training  any  less  than  permanent  employees.  H  we  carry  out the 
regression  only on  the  group of temporary employees we  do  not  find  any  significant 
differences  between  employees  with  a  fixed-term  contract  and  temporary  agency 
workers. There is also no significant difference to be seen between employees expecting 
a permanent job and those not expecting such a job. 
Table 4.  Results of Logistic Regression Analysis Examining the hnpact of the 
Employment Contract on Participation in Traininga. 
Man 
Skilled blue-collar worker 
White collar worker 
Professional 
Executive 
< 25 yrs. 




"Entries are odds ratio's 
*  p < .05 
**  p<.OI 
***  p < .001 
Participation in Training 
1.19 
2.08  * 
5.66  *** 
7.79  *** 






In addition to participation in training,  we also looked at the amount of training taken 
(table 5).  One initial indicator is  the  number of hours of training during the past year. 
The median for permanent employees is 40 hours or approximately one working week. 
Among temporary employees the figure  is  twice as  high.  lonker et al.  (1997) made a 
similar observation. The spread in  terms  of the  number of hours  of training is  rather 
higher for employees with fixed-term contracts than for temporary agency workers. We 
did  not  find  any  statistically  significant  differences  between  employees  expecting  a 
permanent job and those not expecting such a job. 
We then considered how many different types of training were received. We made a 
distinction  between  three  types:  internal  'on  the job'  training,  internal  'off the job' 
training and external training. Half the permanent employees  had received more than 
13 one type  of training.  The majority  of temporary  employees,  on  the  other hand,  have 
received  only  one  type  of  training.  The  division  into  various  types  of  training 
demonstrates  that  mainly  external  training  was  involved  here.  It  is  noticeable  that 
temporary agency staff received more 'on the job' training than employees  with fixed-
term contracts. One possible explanation for this may be the difference in composition 
between the two groups. The group of temporary agency staff includes more blue-collar 
workers (56.5%) than the group of employees with fixed-term contracts (34.2%). It is 
still  questionable,  of course,  whether  blue-collar  workers  and  white-collar  workers 
receive different types of training.  In order to  test this  we  investigated the correlation 
between job level  and the type  of training. We cannot find  any statistically significant 
correlation at all. The difference in job level therefore does not offer any explanation for 
the fact that temporary agency  staff receive more  'on the job' training than employees 
with fixed term  contracts.  'On  the job' training is  often  (sometimes  wrongly)  equated 
with company-specific training (Tharenou, 1997). It is  argued from the Human Capital 
Theory  that  company-specific  training  is  only  profitable  if  the  duration  of  the 
employment relationship is  long  enough.  The fact  that temporary  agency  staff have  a 
greater chance of a permanent contract than employees with temporary contracts may be 
an  alternative  explanation  for  the  observation  that  more  temporary  agency  workers 
receive 'on the job' training. We also, however, cannot find any statistically significant 
correlation between receiving 'on  the job' training  and the expectation of a permanent 
job. 
The results of the analyses above show that, all other things being equal, temporary and 
permanent employees participate in training to the same extent. Temporary employees 
receive a larger number of hours  of training,  on  average. Permanent employees more 
often participate in more different types of training. Half of those permanent employees 
who have received training, received more than one type of training. Among temporary 
employees  the  figure  was  approximately  one-third.  In  addition  to  external  training, 
permanent employees also more often receive 'on the job' training and internal  'off the 
job' training.  This reinforces the supposition that training for permanent employees is 
more often  paid  for  by  the  employer.  In the  next section  we  study  the  financing  of 
training. 
14 Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics. The Amount of Training. 
Permanent  Temporary  p  Fixed-term  Agency- p  High likelihood  Lower likelihood  p 
work  work  contract  work  of  of 
permanent work  permanent work 
How many hours of training 
followed during the past year? 
Average number of hours  69  157  ***  161  148  ns  165  151  ns 
Median (hours)  40  80  80.5  80  75.5  96 
Did you follow this type of 
training? 
On the job training (%)  47.8  28.7  **  20.0  41.9  **  35.5  25.5  ns 
Internal off the job  50.0  36.5  *  38.3  33.9  ns  32.1  39.2  ns 
training (%) 
External training (%)  78.6  77.0  ns  80.6  71.4  ns  83.3  73.5  ns 
Number of types of training  *  ns  ns 
followed: 
I type of training (%)  50.0  66.9  69.2  63.3  61.1  69.2 
2 types of training (%)  32.3  24.5  25.3  23.3  27.8  23.4 
3 types of training (%)  17.7  8.6  5.5  13.3  11.1  7.4 
n  77  175  107  68  66  104 
*  p < .05 
**  p< .01 
***  P < .001 
15 Financing of Training 
In  table  6  we  illustrate  what  proportion  of the  training  received  is  financed  by' the 
employees themselves and what proportion is financed by the employer. 
More than half of ail permanent employees have not invested in the training that they 
received  themselves.  Only  about  a  quarter  of  the  permanent  employees  financed 
(almost) everything themselves. Among temporary employees approximately half paid 
for almost everything themselves. Just over 40% of temporary employees did not invest 
anything themselves in the training they received. These observations are in accordance 
with  the results  of the  study  by Jonker et a1.  (1997).  We can therefore conclude that 
temporary  employees  who  do  go  on  training  courses  invest  in  their  training  more 
frequently than permanent employees. Hypothesis 4 is confirmed. 
We also look at the extent to  which employers finance  training for permanent and 
temporary employees. It is important to point out that this data comes from an employee 
survey. When we talk about 'the employer' this is not the same for all employees. We are 
not  comparing groups of employees within the same company. The results in  table 6 
support  hypothesis  1.  Temporary  employees  are  less  likely  to  have  their  training 
financed  by  their  employer  than  permanent  employees.  For  73%  of  permanent 
employees,  the  training  was  partly  financed  by  their  present  employer.  Among 
temporary employees the figure was only about one-third. One possible explanation may 
be  that  a  majority  of the temporary  employees  have  not  yet  been  working  for  their 
present employer for one year.  If we  add financing by  previous employers,  however, 
nothing much changes in the ratios. 67.7% of temporary employees did not receive any 
financing  for  training  from  their previous  or their current employers during  the  past 
year. 
We  do  not  find  any  significant  differences  between  employees  with  fixed-term 
contracts  and  temporary  agency  workers  as  regards  the extent to  which they  receive 
financing for training from their employers. The results also indicate that only just over 
30% of employees who are expecting a permanent job received financing for  (part of) 
their training from  their present employer.  This  is  a rather larger proportion  than  the 
group  of employees  with  a lower estimate  of their chances  of a permanent job. The 
difference, however, is not significant. In accordance with the Human Capital Theory it 
would  be expected that the  first  group  would  have  a  significantly  greater chance  of 
having  their training  financed  by  the  employer.  That  is  because  the  duration  of the 
employment relationship  is  expected to  be  longer for  this  group.  Here,  however,  we 
have only measured the employee's perception of the likelihood of a permanent contract. 
This perception may be different from the real likelihood of a permanent contract. 
16 Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics (percentages). Financing of Training of Temporary and Permanent Employees. 
Permanent  Temporary  p  Fixed-term  Agency- p  High likelihood  Lower likelihood  p 
work  work  contract  work  of permanent  of permanent 
contract  contract 
% financed by the employee:  **  *  ns 
0%  56.5  42.1  34.7  54.1  50.0  37.5 
<25%  14.5  6.3  8.1  3.3  6.9  6.3 
25% -75%  1.4  3.8  6.1  0.0  1.7  3.1 
>75%  27.5  47.8  51.0  42.6  41.4  53.1 
% financed by the employer:  ***  ns  ns 
0%  26.8  66.9  69.8  62.9  63.8  69.3 
<25%  5.6  3.4  2.3  4.8  5.2  2.3 
25% -75%  9.9  4.7  3.5  6.5  6.8  6.8 
>75%  57.7  25.0  24.4  25.8  29.3  21.6 
n  71  148  86  62  58  88 
*  p < .05 
**  p< .01 
***  P < .001 
17 In order to gain a better view of the factors that determine who finances training, we use 
a number of variables in two logistic regression models. In  the first model the variable 
to be explained is a binary variable with values of 0 (the employee has  not invested in 
the training) and  I (the employee has financed more than  75% of the  training). In the 
second model the variable to be explained is a binary variable which measures whether 
the employer has financed none (0) or more than 75% of the training (1). The results are 
set out in table 7. 
Table 7.  Results of Logistic Regression Analysis Examining the Impact of the 
Employment Contract on Financing of Training". 
Financing by the  Financing by the 
employee  employer 
Man  1.33  1.37 
Skilled blue-collar worker  5.21  1.37 
White collar worker  5.95  *  1.52 
Professional  9.23  *  1.87 
Executive  3.18  6.42 
< 25 yrs.  1.22  1.28 
> 45 yrs.  1.34  1.10 
Single  1.06  .68 
Permanent contract  .39  *  3.94  *** 
n  187  185 
'Entries are odds ratio's 
*  p< .05 
**  p< .01 
***  p< .001 
The results show that the likelihood of employees financing their own training is lower 
for permanent employees than for temporary ones. The odds ratio (.3925) indicates that 
the odds  are  lower by  61%  ((1-.3925)  x  100)  for permanent employees  as  compared 
with temporary employees. Hence even if sex,  age, job level  and family  situation are 
checked,  hypothesis 4  is  still  confirmed.  Temporary employees  who  receive  training 
invest more in their own training than permanent employees. If we look at the model of 
the likelihood that the employer will finance the training as an  independent variable, we 
notice that, all other things being equal, permanent employees are  almost four times as 
likely to have their training financed by their present employer as temporary employees 
(odds  ratio  =  3.94).  Employers  are  more  inclined  to  invest  in  training  for  their 
permanent employees than in training for temporary employees. We do not find that the 
job level has any significant effect on the likelihood that the employer will finance the 
training.  We do  find  that the job level  has  a significant effect  when  we  look at  the 
financing of training by the employee. The likelihood that white-collar employees will 
18 invest in  training is greater than for unskilled blue-collar workers. What is  more, blue-
collar  workers  participate  in  training  less  than  white-collar  employees.  Blue-collar 
workers  mainly participate  in  training  if it  is  paid for  by  the  employer.  White-collar 
employees invest in training more frequently themselves. 
We  carried out the  analysis  separately  for  the  temporary employees.  The  results  are 
shown in table 8. 
Table 8.  Results of Logistic Regression Analysis Examining the Financing of Training 
of Temporary Employees". 
Man 
Skilled blue-collar worker 
White-collar worker 
Professional 
< 25 yrs. 
> 45 yrs. 
Single 
Temporary work is free choice 
More than 6 months of company tenure 
Contract between 6 months and 1 year 
Contract for more than 1 year 
Agency worker 
High likelihood of a permanent job 
Interaction between tenure and likelihood of a 
permanent job 
n 
"Entries are odds ratio's 
*  p < .05 
**  P < .01 
***  P < .001 
Employee  Employer 
1.95  .91 
5.72  1.95 
8.13  *  1.49 
22.50  **  1.67 
2.08  1.48 
1.04  .00 
1.42  .27 
1.48  .32 
.55  8.67  ** 
.45  2.37 
.10  ***  11.04  *** 
.82  .60 
.27  *  3.11 
5.01  .29 
118  114 
remark.  Because the group of temporary workers didn't count any executives whe did not include this job 
level in the analysis. 
The results from model 1 (financing by employee) and model 2 (financing by employer) 
in table 8 are partly a mirror image of each other. Where the odds in the first model are 
less  than  1,  they are often greater than  1 in  this  second model.  This gives  rise to  the 
supposition that those who  receive financing for training from their employer are less 
likely to invest in training themselves. Hence the results show that the likelihood of the 
employer financing the training is greater for employees on  a contract for more than 1 
year than for employees with a contract for less than six months. The likelihood of the 
19 employees financing their training, however, is  lower for employees with a contract for 
more than one year than for employees with a contract for less than six months. 
If we look at the job level, we notice a different phenomenon. The observations are in 
line with the results from table 7. We once again find that the job level does not have a 
significant effect on  the  likelihood of the employer financing  the  training.  When  we 
consider  the  likelihood  that  the  employee  will  finance  the  training,  we  do  notice  a 
significant effect.  The likelihood of unskilled blue-collar workers financing their own 
training is again significantly lower than among the other job groups. Hence the odds for 
professionals are 22 times higher than the odds for unskilled blue-collar workers. The 
results  show  that  more  senior  job  groups  also  finance  supplementary  training 
themselves, in addition to the training financed by their employer. 
Another remarkable observation is  that those employees  expecting a permanent job 
are  less  inclined  to  invest  in  training  themselves  than  employees  not  expecting  a 
permanent  job.  The  likelihood  of  the  employer  financing  training  for  employees 
expecting  a  permanent  contract  is  also  higher.  This  correlation  is  not  significant, 
however (p  = 0.09). We have already emphasised that the expectation of a permanent 
job is  the employees' perception. The employee's perception  and that of the employer 
concerning the  likelihood  of a permanent job may  differ.  This  may  explain  why  the 
correlation between the likelihood of a permanent contract and the likelihood of training 
being  financed  by  the  employer  is  not  very  pronounced.  Time  in  service  with  the 
company and the duration of the contract are objective factors which reveal the duration 
of the employment relationship. More time in service and a contract for a longer period 
both have a positive impact on the likelihood that the employer will finance the training. 
These results demonstrate that the duration of the employment relationship increases the 
likelihood of the employer financing employees' training. 
In  the  next section  we will  study the  reasons  why  employers  and employees  finance 
training. We look at the content and the purpose of the training that is received. 
Content of the training that is received 
In  table 9  we  correlate the way  in  which training  is  financed  and the  purpose of the 
training.  The  'Financing  by  the  employee'  group  covers  those  employees  who  have 
financed more than 75% of their training themselves. The same criterion has been used 
for 'Financing by the employer'. This brings us to a few interesting findings. 
20 Table 9.  Descriptive Statistics (percentages). Content of the Training according to the Investment Source. 
Financing by the  Financing by the  p  Financing by the  Financing by the 
employee  employer  employee  employer 
Permanent  Temporary  p  Permanent  Temporary  p 
What was the purpose of the 
training? 
I.  To get started in my current job  13.7  33.3  **  5.3  15.8  ns  12.2  56.8  *** 
2.  To maintain the necessary skills  23.2  48.7  ***  21.1  23.7  ns  46.3  51.4  ns 
for my current job 
3.  To develop new skills that are  41.1  69.2  ***  !  47.4  39.5  ns  !  68.3  70.3  ns 
necessary for my current job 
4.  To be prepared for future jobs  50.5  25.6  **  31.6  55.3  * 
!  24.4  27.0  ns 
5.  In general. to develop new skills  71.6  38.5  ***  94.7  65.8  *  46.3  29.7  ns 
6.  To strengthen my position on the  57.9  16.7  ***  42.1  61.8  ns  9.8  24.3  ns 
labour market 
n  95  78  19  76  41  37 
*  p< .05 
**  p< .01 
***  p< .001 
21 The results  in  table 9 show that employers invest in  training for different reasons than 
employees. The investment in  training by employers is mainly focused on job-oriented 
training (reasons 2 and 3). When the employee invests in  training, the training is more 
often  for  a purpose  that  transcends  the job  (reasons  4,  5 and  6).  The  investment by 
permanent  employees  is  mainly  focused  on  training  aimed  at  personal  development 
(reason  5).  Among  temporary  employees  more  labour-market  oriented  reasons  for 
receiving  training  are  important  (reasons  4  and  6).  Of course  training  intended  to 
develop  new  skills  in  general  can contribute towards  a better  position  in  the  labour 
market. The data does, however, mainly show that the reasons for taking and financing 
training among permanent employees are less directly focused  on career opportunities 
than  among  temporary  employees.  Hypothesis  5  is  confirmed.  The  investment  in 
training  by  temporary  employees  is  mainly  focused  on  general  training  intended  to 
reinforce their position in the labour market. 
When we look at those employees whose employers have financed the training, we do 
not notice many significant differences between  temporary and  permanent employees. 
Temporary employees more often receive training in order to get started in their present 
job.  The  results  also  show  that  for  both  permanent  and  temporary  employees  the 
investment by their employer is mainly aimed at job-related training. We cannot directly 
deduce from  this,  however,  that employers  only  invest  in  company-specific training. 
lob-related training does not necessarily have to  be company-specific. The results also 
indicate that employers are not completely negative about investing in general training. 
Hence  the  situation  is  less  extreme  than  the  Human  Capital  Theory  presupposes. 
Permanent employees receive rather more training in  the development of new  skills in 
general  than  temporary  employees.  Contrary  to  the  assertions  of the Human  Capital 
Theory, employers are therefore willing to invest in general training. There is less of a 
tendency to do this where temporary employees are involved. The difference, however, 
is  not significant. The results strengthen the  belief that hypotheses  2a and 2b  are true. 
Nevertheless we cannot completely prove these statements. 
CONCLUSION 
In this essay we have sought to answer the question of whether temporary employment 
relationships discourage the promotion of employability rather than encouraging it. The 
observation  that  employees  who  have  less  job security  are  also  less  participating  in 
employability enhancing activities could point to  the  accumulation  of risks.  We have 
looked at one important employability enhancing activity,  namely training. We do  not 
claim  to  have  executed  an  all-encompassing  comparison  of  the  employability  of 
temporary and permanent employees. The emphasis has been on two research questions. 
1.  Do temporary and permanent employees receive the same opportunities from their 
employers to promote their employability through training? 
The results show that training for permanent employees is more frequently financed by 
employers  than  training  for  temporary  employees.  Hypothesis  1  is  confirmed. 
Temporary  employees  are  less  likely  to  receive  training  from  their  employers  than 
permanent employees. Since temporary employees therefore get fewer opportunities to 
22 reinforce their position in the labour market, this could give rise to an increasing duality 
in the labour market. This must be put in perspective, however. 
The results  show that  company training is  mainly job-oriented and  is  less  directly 
intended to  reinforce  employees'  position  in  the  labour market.  This  applies  both to 
temporary and to permanent employees. Employers' training policy therefore does  not 
contribute  much  towards  'life-long  learning'  for  either  temporary  or  permanent 
employees. Previous research (Sels et aI, 2000) has already shown that company training 
in  Flanders  mainly  functions  as  a  lubricant  to  counteract  the  friction  between  the 
educational system and  the labour market or between  the  internal  and external labour 
markets.  Company training  policy  is  sometimes  portrayed  too  enthusiastically  as  an 
instrument of 'life-long learning'. Hence we would rush to conclusions by claiming that 
there is clear duality between permanent and temporary employees. The training policy 
for  both  temporary and  permanent employees does  not  contribute  much towards  the 
ideal of 'lifelong learning'. 
2.  Are there differences  in  the extent to  which temporary  and permanent employees 
devote  time  and  energy  to  their training  and  development  to  promote their  own 
employability? 
The results show that temporary employees take a high level of responsibility for their 
own employability in  the  labour market.  A larger proportion  of temporary employees 
than permanent employees invest in training themselves. What is involved here is often 
training intended to  reinforce  their position  in  the  labour market or to  improve their 
chances  of making  further  progress.  When  permanent  employees  invest  in  training 
themselves this is  not as  often done directly with a view to  better career opportunities. 
This shows that temporary employees do make an effort to enhance their employability 
in the labour market. 
Further analyses of the data, however,  show that the search for greater job security 
with one employer is  still a priority for temporary employees (Forrier et aI,  2001). The 
traditional career model  in  which someone can have a career with  the same employer 
and enjoy job security is not yet outdated. Those who work in temporary employment do 
so mainly in the absence of anything better rather than on the basis of a new vision of 
their career.  All  the efforts  of temporary employees  to  improve  their position  in  the 
labour market are mainly based on their desire for  greater job security.  They have not 
necessarily appropriated the 'employability idea' themselves. We can conclude that those 
who need a high level of employability on the external labour market do not get as many 
opportunities from  their employers to  develop it.  Those  who  fall  into the 'temporary 
work'  trap,  so  to speak,  have to  get  out of it themselves.  In  the  'new'  psychological 
contract,  relationships  have  got  out  of  balance  (Thunnissen  &  de  Lange,  2000). 
Although temporary employees do largely take responsibility for their own training and 
careers,  we  cannot conclude  from  this  that  temporary  employment relationships  and 
employability  go  harmoniously  together.  The  opposite  is  true.  Those  with  less  job 
security are to some extent discriminated against  when  it  comes  to the  promotion  of 
employability.  'Life-time  employability'  therefore  cannot  be  put  forward  as  an  ideal 
alternative to 'life-time employment'. For many people 'life time employment' is still the 
ideal career model, especially perhaps for those for whom it remains a distant dream. 
23 Some lessons can  be  drawn from  these results in  relation to  'lifelong learning'.  In the 
2000-2004 Policy Note from  Flemish Minister for  Employment Landuyt,  the  right to 
'lifelong learning'  is  put forward  as  a basic right of citizens.  The memorandum states 
that the  policy of the  government should be  expressed,  among  other things,  through 
greater attention being devoted to the individual. This study shows that this is necessary. 
The  training  needs  of individual  employees  are  not,  by  definition,  bound  to  their 
company. Certainly not when employees are not associated with a company for so long 
and  when  they build their careers  with  multiple  employers.  The results  indicate that 
temporary employees do participate in training but that to a large extent they have  to 
finance it themselves. If  employees have to take responsibility for their own professional 
training and career planning, they must have the same resources at their disposal. Some 
assistance,  such  as  a  training  voucher,  may  offer  a  solution  here.  A  financial 
contribution may  provide a reward  for  those  who  are  already  working  on  their own 
employability  and  a  stimulus  for  those  who  are  not  yet  doing  so.  The  policy 
memorandum itself puts forward three instruments: the provision of careers advice, the 
organisation of skills assessment and creating opportunities for a career break in order to 
pursue training. These instruments will encourage individuals to take responsibility for 
their own careers. This study certainly shows that temporary employees are the priority 
target group for these actions. 
The findings  of this  study also feed  into the 'flexicurity' debate.  The word 'flexicurity' 
brings together the ideas of flexibility and security and points to efforts to achieve a new 
balance between the interests of employers and employees in industrial relations. On the 
one hand initiatives aimed at 'flexicurity' must encourage flexible company management 
for employers, and on the other hand they are also intended to  achieve greater job and 
income  security  for  flexible  employees.  A  number  of initiatives  have  already  been 
introduced in this area in  the Netherlands. On  1 January  1999 the new Flexibility and 
Security Act came into force in the Netherlands. The Flexibility and Security Act shows 
that  combined  forms  of  contractual  flexibility  and  security  are  possible.  The 
development  of new  forms  of  'flexicurity'  may  also  help  temporary  employees  to 
develop  their  careers  according  to  their  wishes.  The  question  still  remains  whether 
Flanders and Belgium should follow the Netherlands in this. The fact that Dutch society 
guarantees flexibility through intervention in  the contractual domain is  inherent in  the 
choices  made  in  designing the  framework  of industrial  law  in  the  past.  The  Flemish 
(Belgian) economy seeks to achieve flexibility through different, functionally equivalent 
structures such as  "temporary unemployment" (Sels and Van Hootegem, 2001). Efforts 
to  find  a combination of flexibility  and security within  the  framework created by the 
regulation of working time and production time may also result in  a valid alternative to 
the Dutch construction. 
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